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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of:
JAMES EARL BACON, also known as
JAMES E. BACON,

Case No. 14295

Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action arising out of objections filed by
appellant to the appointment of the administrator with will
annexed.

Appellant further objects to probate of Will and Trust

Agreement of James Earl Bacon.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court refused to appoint appellant as the
administratrix of the estate of deceased James E. Bacon and
dismissed without hearing her further objections to probate of
the Olographic Will of James Earl Bacon and the distribution of
the estate in accordance with a Trust Agreement filed with the
court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's appointment
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of George Mangum as administrator of the estate of James Earl
Bacon and judgment that neither the Olographic Will or the Trust
Agreement provide a basis for the distribution of the estate of
James Earl Bacon.

Appellant asserts that said estate must then

be distributed as though James Earl Bacon died intestate and
without the Trust Agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Earl Bacon died on October 23, 1973 at Roosevelt,
Utah.

He left an estate consisting of both real and personal

property in Duchesne County.
Earl Bacon.

Appellant is the niece of James

She filed on November 18, 1974 a petition for the

appointment of herself as administratrix of the estate of James
Earl Bacon.

Her petition reveals that there are numerous

relatives of James Earl Bacon with approximately the same relationship to him as she has.

The petition for appointment was set for

hearing on the 9th of December, 1974.

An order was entered

appointing appellant administratrix, there having been no objection.
The order of appointment was conditioned upon there being no Will
filed for probate within fifteen days.
On the 17th of January, 1975, George E. Mangum filed a
Verified Cross-Petition for Admission of Olographic Will and
Special Trust into Probate.

Attached to the petition was an

Olographic Will and a document entitled "Special Trust of James E.
Bacon, a Single Man11 (R. 9-15).

Appellant objected to the

appointment of Mangum as the administrator.

This objection was
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heard on the 24th of March, 1975.

On the 22nd of May, 1975, the

court ordered the Olographic Will admitted to probate, appointed
George E. Mangum as the administrator with Will annexed.

The

reason cited was that he was the Bishop of the ward intended by
decedent to be the beneficiary of decedent's estate.

Letters of

Administration were issued on the 29th of May, 1975.
On the 19th of June appellant filed objections to the
probate of the Will and the distribution of the estate in
accordance with the Special Trust of James E. Bacon (R. 24).
The administrator replied to the objections (R. 29). Appellant
requested a trial setting on the issues as made by her objections
and the answer.
trial setting.

The administrator objected to the request for
On the 10th of September, without a hearing,

appellant's objection was stricken and it was ordered that the
probate of the decedent estate proceed in the due and usual form
(R. 34). Notice of Appeal was filed on the 8th of October, 1975.
Administrator objects to the appeal on the ground that it
was not timely filed.

Appellant's appeal was taken within the

thirty days after the order of the court dismissing her objection
to probate of Will and distribution in accordance with the Special
Trust of James E. Bacon.

The appeal is within the period permitted

for the contest of probate matters as set forth in Utah Code
Annotated 75-3-12, which fixes six months after admission to
probate for objection.
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The facts now before the court involve the following
material matters.

George E. Mangum has been appointed the

administrator of the estate and has qualified.

The Olographic

Will and the Trust Agreement have both been filed with the court.
It appears that these documents will govern the distribution of
the estate of James Earl Bacon.
The Findings of Fact which the court has heretofore entered
appearing inthe Record between pages 20 and 22, outline the matters
which appellant believes should determine that neither the Olographic
Will nor the Trust Agreement provide a basis for the distribution
of the estate of James Earl Bacon.
(1)

The facts are as follows:

James Earl Bacon made an Olographic Will.

In that

Will he attempted to leave the residue of his estate to the
Roosevelt Fourth Ward.
(2)

The Olographic Will was admitted to probate and was

executed when the decedent was in sound mind and without being
under undue influence.
(3)

Roosevelt First Ward is the home ward of decedent and

the successor to the previous home ward, Roosevelt Fourth Ward.
Neither Roosevelt First Ward nor Roosevelt Fourth Ward are
corporate soles.

Neither of said wards is the one designated in

the Trust as the recipient of the residue of the James E. Bacon
estate.

In the Trust the recipient is Roosevelt Ward, a corporate

sole.
(4)

Neither the Olographic Will nor the Trust Agreement

contain any kind of standard for the supervision of the expenditure
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of either a testamentary trust under the Olographic Will or the
specific trust created by a written document.

In addition to

this defect in the documents, there isnot designated any person
or corporation by either document that can accept title to property
under the laws of the State of Utah.
(5)

The Olographic Will seems to be free from serious

defect as far as its execution is concerned, but this document is
not to control the use of the Bacon estate.

The document which

will control the use of the Bacon estate, if appellant is not
successful, is the Trust Agreement.

This document is seriously

defective.
(a)

If it is to be considered a Will, it was not

executed in accordance with the statutes of the State
of Utah.
(b)

It contains every weakness that the Statute

of^Wills was intended to remedy:
(1) the document was prepared by the chief
beneficiary and designated trustee,
(2) the estate

would be under the trusteefs

supervision,
(3) as Bishop of the ward, he would have control
of all of the benefits that would be available out of the
use of the estate,
(4) this use would be uncontrolled since there
is no purpose set forth in the Trust Agreement that could
be supervised by the court or any other regulatory agency.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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No person was nominated to be executor in the Olographic
Will.

The Will had not been presented for probate in the time

permitted by statute and no substantial reason given for such
failure.

The terms of the Trust Agreement are inconsistent with

the Olographic Will on several counts:
(a)

It removes from the estate all of the property

that the decedent owned.
(b)

It changed the beneficiary from the First Ward

of Roosevelt to a corporate sole, Roosevelt Ward.

The

court then changed it back in his orders to the First
Ward or home ward.

A Mormon ward cannot qualify to hold

property since it is neither a person nor a corporation.
Two exhibits that have been received demonstrate that the
deceased had a different kind of purpose in mind than is expressed
in the Trust Agreement.

No purpose is stated with sufficient

particularity as to provide the standard for enforcement.

A

letter received from the attorneys for the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints has notes around the margin written by the
decedent indicating his disagreement with the letter and his
unwillingness to execute a Will which would place his property
in the hands of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
What decedent desired, it appears, is to establish a rest
home in Roosevelt where people such as himself and his sister,
Prudence, could be cared for by their neighbors and by the people
in their own ward with whom they were acquainted.
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Neither the

Trust nor Will distributing the estate of James Earl Bacon will
in any way accomplish the purposes Bacon stated he wished his
estate devoted to.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPOINTED ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES EARL BACON.
Appellant is a niece of deceased and as close a relative
as survived him.

Under Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., the language is

imperative that letters must be granted to one of the persons
in the classes set forth by the Section.

Appellant is named also

in the Trust Agreement as being the person to divide personal
effects among family members (Special Trust of James E. Bacon,
a Single Man, f4).
No executor is named in the Olographic Will.

The attempt

to create a testamentary trust in the Olographic Will designates
a Bishop of the Fourth Ward to appoint a permanent estate and
guardian committee to be composed of various ward officials
(See Olographic Will).

The Special Trust appoints the Bishop

of Roosevelt Ward as the Trustee, and at the time of the creation
of the trust, that person was George E. Mangum.
It is appellant's position that the trial court had no
discretion in this matter, the words of the statute being imperative
and the language being that letters must be granted to appellant.
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Appellant filed her petition on the 18th of November,1974.
The Petition for Appointment and for Admission of the Olographic
Will and Trust Agreement were not filed until the 11th of January,
1975.
Appellant believes that the failure of respondent to file
the Olographic Will for probate within the thirty days permitted
by Section 75-3-1, U.C.A. forfeits the right of the possessor of
a Will to be executor (75-3-4, U.C.A.).
nominated in the Olographic Will.
entitled to

Respondent is not

Appellant submits she is

be appointed as the administratrix with Will annexed

as the only qualified person.
Section 75-3-19, U.C.A., assists in the interpretation and
supports appellant's position.
or minor nominee.

This section covers the absent

Where such a person is nominated and cannot

qualify, then Letters of Administration with Will annexed must
be granted to a person qualified to be administratrix under
Section 75-4-1.

Section 75-3-21 specifically covers the situation

where no executor was named in the Will and provides the form for
the appointment of an administrator with Will annexed.
C.J.S., Volume 34, Section 1031, page 1286, states as
follows:
"Statutes regulating the order in which administration
with the will annexed may be granted usually are
mandatory and leave courts no discretion in the matter11.
In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 Pac. 299, is a
situation where the person nominated in the Will failed to apply
within the time permitted and the court exercised jurisdiction
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and discretion in appointing another person.
The leading case in Utah is In re Clowardfs Estate, 95
Utah 453, 82 P.2d 336.

In the decision the court stated carefully

the law applicable and said:
"The first section entitled, "Letters of Administration.
To Whom Granted," clearly indicates the purpose of the
law to keep administration within those beneficially
interested in the estate. It provides: (a) Letters
must be granted to the persons therein mentioned
(strangers to the estate are not mentioned). (b) Even
the mentioned groups can administer only when they
are entitled to succeed to personal estate. (c) The
right to administer is such a valuable one that the
person with preferential right may in writing designate
who shall act if he does not choose to act personally.
(d) Any person not enumerated in the section may be
appointed only when the person enumerated and entitled
to letters shall designate him in a writing filed in
the court."
There can be no question but that petitioner is a person
beneficially interested in the estate of James Earl Bacon.

She

is mentioned not only in the trust, but is a person who would
take the estate if a lawful and effective disposition has not
been made by deceased.

As is noted in Cloward, supra, we are

defining persons who are entitled to inherit.
For the basic proposition that language such as contained
in our Sections require the appointment of one of the persons
named and in the order set forth as administrator, see In re
Schwartz Estate, 179 P.2d 863, 79 Cal.App. 2d 301,
Estate, 100 Cal Rep 809, 22 C C A . 3rd 617,
Estate, 12 N.Y.S. 2d, 328, 171 Misc. 238,
206 N.Y.S. 24, 123 Misc. 548,

Cummings

In re Blackburn's

In re Eggsmore Estate,

State ex rel Fansher v. Guinoette,

58 S.W.2d 1005, 227 Mo App 902.
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i

One of the cases decided by this court in the last ten
years is The Matter of the Estate of Dallas Bedford Lewis, 19 Utah
2d 278, 430 P.2d 904.

This court excused the executors from

petitioning within fifty days after the death of the deceased
and recognized the trustees qualified in California as the
administrators of the estate in Utah.
The Honorable A. H. Ellett dissented.

His dissenting

opinion points out the importance that the court attaches to
prompt filing of wills and documents and the qualification of
persons entitled to administer.

Judge Ellett was of the opinion

that a delay of fifty days after death was inexcusable under the
language of 75-3-4, U.C.A.
In the present matter, the respondent was in possession
of the documents, Olographic Will and Trust, for a period of
fifteen months after decedent!s death and failed to come forward
with the documents until after appellant had filed for appointment
of herself.

If Judge EllettTs argument in the Lewis case has

merit, how much greater is the argument in the present case for
disallowing the late respondent's petition for appointment.
These arguments were made to the trial court and he chose
to ignore them and to appoint the respondent as administrator
with Will annexed.

*

The issues made by the pleadings presented only the question
of who had the right to be appointed, yet in the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law the trial court went far beyond said issues
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and made findings on matters that were not presented by appellant
nor by respondent in the answering petition seeking his own
appointment as administrator.
Appellant's position is that the order appointing was
erroneous and that she should have been appointed as the
administratrix of the estate of James Earl Bacon, deceased, with
Will annexed, and permitted to qualify for the administration of
the estate in accordance with the Probate Code.
POINT II
THE TRUST AGREEMENT REVOKED THE OLOGRAPHIC WILL.
An examination of the Olographic Will and the Trust
Agreement clearly shows that the Trust Agreement was subsequent
in time and covered the very same subject as the Olographic Will
and was intended to supersede and, as a practical matter, revoke
the Olographic Will.

The estate of James Earl Bacon, by the terms

of the Trust Agreement, was placed in the trust and subjected to
the terms and conditions of the Trust Agreement and the provisions
thereof.
While the Trust Agreement could not be claimed to be a Will
or effective as a testamentary instrument, since it was not
executed with the formalities required for testamentary instruments,
it did have an immediate effect.

Parts of the estate were placed

in trust and the Trustee authorized to use the proceeds and income
for the support and care of Trustor and, to that degree, the Trust
Agreement is an effective agreement between the Trustor and
Trustee.
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The Trust Agreement also contained language which is so
inconsistent with the existence of a Will disposing of the property
of the deceased.

It shows an intention by Trustor and should have

been so interpreted by the trial court as a document revoking and
superseding the Olographic Will.
If the Olographic Will has been revoked, then it is
appellant's position that she is entitled to be appointed
administratrix of the estate of James Earl Bacon.

She wishes to

proceed and handle his estate in accordance with the probate
statutes of the State of Utah.
There are many actions which should be taken, including
publishing of notice to creditors and marshalling of assets.
Appellant submits that in the marshalling of assets she would be
in a position to examine and submit to the court the Trust
Agreement so that its validity, effectiveness, and use as a
testamentary disposition could be passed upon by the court.
Under the present orders of the court, no such test can
ever be effectively mounted.

The Trustee certainly will not submit

to the court any propositions which will permit the court to pass
upon the basic validity of the Trust Agreement under which he is
empowered and acting.
It is submitted then that the appellant is the person
interested in the probate of the estate of James Earl Bacon.
Respondent is taking the position that there is no estate and
that the Trust Agreement provides the instrument through which
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the assets of James Earl Bacon will be distributed.
outside the Probate Court's jurisdiction.

This is

There will be no

supervision and there will be no requirement that the Probate
Code provisions be complied with and the estate administered
under the law provided for probate.
A most serious objection to the Trust Agreement being used
as the document controlling the distribution of the estate of
Bacon arises out of the relationship existing between George
Mangum and decedent.
counselor.

Mangum was decedent's Bishop and spiritual

He was also decedent's attorney.

In addition, as

Trustee, the Trust Agreement gave great practical benefits to
Mangum.
A presumption of undue influence arises in a number of
situations and has been recognized by this court.

In re SwanT s

Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682, the burden of discharging
such a presumption is discussed and the attorney and counselor
for Mrs. Swan failed in their efforts to overcome the presumption.
As far as attorney-client relationship exists, additional
facts that must be considered are that Mangum prepared the Trust
Agreement and was the Trustee as well as the Bishop of the ward
who became the chief beneficiary.

The general rule set forth in

94 C.J.S., page 1093, Section 239, is as follows:
M

0n the other hand, it is the general rule in
practically all jurisdictions that undue influence
is presumed and the burden of proof shifted so as
to require the beneficiary to produce evidence
which at least balances that of the contestant,
when, in addition to the confidential relation,
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there exist suspicious circumstances, such as the
fact that the beneficiary or person who benefits
by the will took part or participated in the preparation
or procuring of the will, or actually drafted it or
assisted in its execution; but the part taken by the
beneficiary must go to the substance of the testamentary
act, and not to some mere formal matter, and no
presumption of undue influence will be raised where
the activity of the beneficiary in the preparation,
drafting, or execution of the will was in compliance
with the request of the testator.ff
The evidence indicates that Bacon had cancer and after
the execution of the Trust Agreement did not return to his normal
habitat or activities.

For a discussion of the circumstances

that must prevail where a priest was beneficiary, this court
discussed at length the problem in In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah
390, 25 P.2d 602.

Many of the principles set forth as the law

of Utah in the decision are applicable here and

certainly raise

a question that appellant should be entitled to explore and have
a day in court.
The June 19, 19 75 objection was intended to raise the
issues for examination by the trial court relating to the
effectiveness of the Olographic Will and Trust Agreement as
instruments through which probate or distribution of the estate
of James E. Bacon, deceased, could be consummated.
has never been heard by the court.

This objection

The objections were stricken

without hearing.
It is respectfully submitted that the objections contained
in the petition of June 19 raise serious questions and require
an interpretation of the two instruments relating to the estate
of James Earl Bacon.
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Appellant respectfully submits that the court erred in
striking her objections.
POINT III
NEITHER THE OLOGRAPHIC WILL NOR THE TRUST AGREEMENT
PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE, ENFORCEABLE OR LAWFUL BASIS
TO GOVERN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BACON ESTATE.
Appellant's first position is that there is no trustee
qualified by either of the two documents to take property under
the laws of the State of Utah.

No corporation or person is made

the beneficiary of the trust, but an unidentified shifting and
changing group of people are specified as beneficiaries.
It will be noted in the Olographic Will that Bacon wanted
his Fourth Ward congregation to be a beneficiary, and between
the time of its preparation and the time that he died, the Fourth
Ward had been divided and now there was a Fourth and First Ward.
This issue was resolved in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law filed in the matter, though that issue was never presented
by appellant in her petition for appointment of herself as the
administratrix.
It will be noted that neither the First Ward nor the Fourth
Ward is the named beneficiary in the Trust Agreement.

A corporate

sole whose identity is named as Roosevelt Ward is beneficiary.
In her petition of the 19th of June, appellant denies the existence
of the corporate sole, Roosevelt Ward.

Whether it exists or not,

it certainly is not the ward that James Earl Bacon intended to
have the benefit of his estate.
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This indefiniteness of identity of beneficiary is a basic
and fundamental defect which makes the Olographic Will and the
Trust Agreement both ineffectual.

Both documents are too uncertain

to be used in the distribution and control of the estate of Bacon.
i

- .

It is clear that under Section'74-1-4, U,C,A. 1953, property
may not be left to any entity other than a corporation or person.
An unincorporated association not being qualified to accept title
i

to property.

This matter was discussed and so interpreted in

Estate of Sam N. Manatakis v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d
412, 303 P.2d 701.

Respondent recognizes this problem and, as a

consequence, attempted to name as beneficiary a corporate sole
that was incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah in
articles dated November 7, 1928.

Corporation was then named

.

Roosevelt Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints.

Through subsequent amendments, the name of said corporation

now appears to be Roosevelt First Corporation of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

-

However, it does not appear

to be the First Ward nor the Fourth Ward, and apparently was
intended to cover the whole area encompassed in Roosevelt, Utah

4

at the time of its incorporation.
The court, in its Findings, Conclusions and Decree, concluded
that what Bacon really wanted was his home ward, Roosevelt First

{

Ward, as beneficiary, which is not the corporate sole referred
to in the Trust Agreement nor the one that actually was incorporated,
but a subdivision of the early Roosevelt area that obtained the
corporate sole status in 1928.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

Respondent recognizes this problem and by the attempt to
maneuver the corporate sole entity into the beneficiary status,
admits that unless there is a corporate sole intended by Bacon
to take his estate, there is lack of capacity in the beneficiary.
The American Law Institute Restatement of Trusts, Volume 2,
page 249, Section 116, sets forth the rule that a person who has
capacity to hold title to property has the capacity to be beneficiary
of a trust of such property.

Section 117 then sets forth the

corollary that a person who has no capacity to take legal title to
property has no capacity to become a beneficiary of a trust.
Section 119, which is an exception to the last stated rule cited
on page 250, indicates that unincorporated associations have the
power to become beneficiaries.

In discussing beneficiaries who

are in an unincorporated association, on page 251, Illustration
No. 2, fits exactly the situation in the Bacon Trust.

What Bacon

indicates in his trust is that the money be used for exDenses of
a ward, unincorporated association, and for whatever expenses of
the ward the Trustees deem appropriate, but not the usual operating
expenses of a ward.

Illustration No. 2 reads as follows:

,f

A bequeaths $10,000 to B in trust to use the income
forever to pay the running expenses of the C college
chapter of the Alpha Omega fraternity. The fraternity
is an unincorporated association comprised of college
students elected to membership from time to time.
The C college chapter is an unincorporated branch of
the fraternity. The trust is invalid."
Appellant's second position is that the Trust Agreement
and the Olographic Will both are basically defective in that the
purposes set forth in both documents are so indefinite and so
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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uncertain that the court has no basis on which it can control the
use and distribution of the estate.
It is certainly not true that James Earl Bacon wanted his
estate divided up among the members of his First Ward and
distributed to each of them pro-rata as of the time of his death.
Neither the Olographic Will nor the Trust Agreement provides for
that.

He did not specify that there would be any particular
•

"

•

<

purpose, and he definitely did not want it used for the ordinary
use that members of the ward would receive as ward members. He
wanted it used for some other purpose.

Just exactly what that
{

purpose is is not set down in either the Olographic Will nor the
Trust Agreement.
The Law of Trusts seems to be clear that for a trust to
(

be effective, there must be a standard set down in the Trust
Agreement that can be enforced by the courts charged with enforcing
such instruments.

Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Chapter 2,

Section 25, page 69, sets down unequivocably:
"No trust is created unless the settlor manifests
intention to impose enforceable duties."
See also Ponzelino v. Ponzelino, 238 Iowa 201, 26 NW 2d 330,
which sets down the rule that an alleged trust deed is invalid
because no enforceable obligation is imposed upon the plaintiff
as Trustee.
It is respectfully submitted that neither the Olographic
Will nor the Trust Agreement impose any enforceable obligation on
the trustees or committee to be organized by trustee under the
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(

terms of the documents.

Appellant submits that the trust is an

invalid trust in both documents and that the property of James
Earl Bacon should then be distributed under the laws governing
intestacy and to his natural heirs.
It will be noted that there have been attempts by legal
counsel of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to
obtain title to the James Earl Bacon estate in the First Presidency
of the Church, the only organization entitled to hold title to
the property.
do this.

Bacon specifically and categorically refused to

The letter from counsel for the Church and the proposed

Will are both before the court and it can see, without any
possibility of equivocation, that Bacon did not want that to
happen.

The letters and documents would indicate that what James

Earl Bacon had in mind was providing a rest home in Roosevelt
where persons such as himself and his sister, Prudence Parrish,
could be cared for in their own home environment rather than being
taken some other place out of Roosevelt into strangers1 hands
where persons other than of the L.D.S. faith would be charged
with their care.

This purpose, however, is not set down in either

the Olographic Will or the Trust in a manner that would give a
court or any person control and direction so that his desires could
be accomplished.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that these documents fail as
a Will and as a Trust Agreement and the estate should be distributed
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to the heirs of James Earl Bacon under the Probate Code.

That

appellant should be appointed administratrix of the Bacon Estate
and proceed with probate under the Probate Code.

Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Appellant
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